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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
PlaintiffAppellee,
v.
CAMERON THOMAS LOPES,
Defendant/Appellant.

CaseNo.20000309-SC
Priority No. 2

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appellant Cameron Lopes is seeking enforcement of this Court's remand order in
State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, 980 P.2d 191 ("Lopes I"). There, this Court ruled that Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995) was unconstitutional in relevant part. The Court reversed
and remanded Lopes's case for a new trial on the gang enhancement charge. Lopes I,
1999 UT 24,fflfl,21, 22. During remand proceedings, the trial judge denied Lopes's
request for a new trial, modified the conviction at the request of the prosecutor, and
entered judgment against Lopes. This appeal followed. Lopes maintains he is entitled to
a new trial as ordered by this Court.
In response to Lopes's appeal, the state claims Lopes failed to preserve aspects of
his argument and has misconstrued this Court's ruling in Lopes I. As set forth below, the
state's arguments seem to be based on misunderstandings and misinterpretations. See
infra, subpoints A. and B., herein.
In addition, the state argues that in the original proceedings in this case, Lopes

entered into a bifurcated plea, thereby supporting that Lopes was not entitled to a trial on
the underlying criminal homicide elements with firearm enhancement. (State's Brief of
Appellee ("S.B.") at 15-23.) The record does not support the state's argument. See infra,
subpoint C, herein; and Brief of Appellant, dated October 13, 2000, at subpoint C.
For the reasons set forth herein and in the opening Brief of Appellant, Lopes
respectfully requests the entry of an order enforcing this Court's ruling in Lopes I.
ARGUMENT
LOPES IS SEEKING ENFORCEMENT OF THIS COURT'S ORDER
In the previous appeal in this case, Lopes asked this Court to find that Section 763-203.1 violated certain constitutional rights. Lopes L 1999 UT 24, ^jl. Specifically, the
statute allowed a sentencing court to increase punishment for an underlying offense based
on proof that defendant committed the offense "in concert" with two or more persons.
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995). Also, the statute provided that "[t]he sentencing judge rather than the jury shall decide whether to impose the enhanced penalty under
this section." Lopes L 1999 UT 24, ^[17 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.l(5)(c)).
In the original appeal, Lopes argued that the statute created an enhanced crime of a
higher degree. See idL atfflfl1-15. That is, the legislature provided for imposition of an
enhancement upon proof of elements over and above those required for a crime of lesser
consequence. Inasmuch as the additional elements served to elevate the underlying
offense into an enhanced offense, Lopes was entitled to have the state prove the

2

additional elements to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at ^[5. In that regard,
subsection (5)(c) — which specifically denied defendant the right to a jury determination - interfered with Lopes's constitutional rights. IdL at f 16.
This Court agreed. It declared subsection (5)(c) of the statute unconstitutional. Id.
Thereafter, the Court severed the offensive subsection (5)(c) from § 76-3-203.1 and declared "the remaining portion of the gang enhancement statute constitutional." Id. at ^|20.
After determining that Lopes prevailed on appeal, this Court remanded the case for a new
trial on the "gang enhancement charge." Id. at ^[21.
Lopes maintains that in accordance with Lopes I, the "gang enhancement charge"
consists of the elements of the underlying crime and the in-concert elements. Thus, pursuant to Lopes L the trial court was required to hold a trial on the in-concert murder charge.
The state disagrees and has asked this Court to reject Lopes's arguments for the
following reasons. First, the state claims that in Lopes L this Court determined that § 763-203.1 created an offense separatefromthe homicide elements and firearm enhancement. (S.B. at 11-13.) Thus, this Court's order of remand for a new trial on the "gang
enhancement charge" contemplated a new trial only on the in-concert elements, not on the
underlying homicide elements and firearm enhancement. (See S.B. at 13.)1 The state's

1

The state seems to use the terms "enhanced offense" and "enhancement offense" as
separate and distinct concepts. (See S.B. at 11-12.) Yet, the terms as used here are
synonymous. .See Black's Law Dictionary 550 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "enhancement" as
"the state of being enhanced"; and defining "enhanced" as "made greater; increased").
3

interpretation is incorrect. The remand order contemplated a new trial on the
enhancement charge of murder. See infra, subpoints A.l. & 2.
Second, the state claims that even if Lopes's argument is correct, he cannot prevail
on appeal because he did not "preserve his claim that in Lopes /this Court recognized
that the gang enhancement statute had the effect of transforming an underlying offense
into a new, greater, enhanced offense.'" (S.B. at 10.) Again, the state's argument is mistaken. The arguments were preserved. See infra, subpoints A.L, 2. & 3. Indeed, with
respect to both the state's interpretation of the matter and the preservation argument, the
"law of the case" doctrine governs, as set forth in subpoint A.
Lopes responds to additional arguments made by the state in subpoints B. and C,
below.
A. THE STATE'S PRESERVATION ARGUMENT DISREGARDS THE
RECORD AND MISCONSTRUES THIS COURT'S RULING IN LOPESI.
1. This Court's Ruling in Lopes I Constitutes the Law of the Case.
"The express ruling by this Court on all issues raised by prior appeal becomes the
law of the case and is binding upon the parties, the trial court and this Court." C & J
Industries, Inc. v. Bailey, 669 P.2d 855, 856 (Utah 1983) (citing Prudential Federal
Savings & Loan Ass'n v. ST. Paul Ins. Cos., 22 Utah 2d 70, 448 P.2d 724 (1968); Davis
v. Pavne & Day, Inc., 12 Utah 2d 107, 363 P.2d 498 (1961)).
The decision of the appellate court becomes "the law of the case, and we will not
now rule otherwise." Scott v. Majors, 1999 UT App 139, ^[14, 980 P.2d 214 (citing C. &
4

J. Industries. Inc., 669 P.2d at 856); see also Corbett v. Fitzgerald. 709 P.2d 384, 386
(Utah 1985); In re Adoption of BBC. 849 P.2d 769, 772 (Wyo. 1993) (on remand, the
trial court has jurisdiction only to the extent conferred by the appellate court's opinion
and mandate).
According to the "law of the case" doctrine,
[A] district court generally may not deviate from a mandate issued by an appellate
court, see Briggs v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 334 U.S. 304, 306, 68 S.Ct. 1039,
1040, 92 L.Ed. 1403 (1948), and the appellate court retains the right to control the
actions of the district court where the mandate has been misconstrued or has not
been given full effect, see In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., 160 U.S. 247, 255, 16
S.Ct. 291, 293,40 L.Ed. 414 (1895); see also In re Ivan F. Boesky Securities
Litigation, 957 F.2d 65, 69 (2d Cir.1992). Indeed, because the district court has no
discretion in carrying out the mandate, the appellate court retains the authority to
determine whether the terms of the mandate have been "scrupulously and fully
carried out". United States v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 81
S.Ct. 1243, 6 L.Ed.2d 318 (1961). The district court's actions on remand should
not be inconsistent with either the express terms or the spirit of the mandate. See
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
Ginett v. Computer Task Group. Inc.. 11 F.3d 359, 360-61 (2d Cir. 1993).
This Court's ruling in Lopes I is the law of this case. There, this Court expressly
ruled that Section 76-3-203.1 has the effect of transforming an underlying offense into a
greater, enhanced offense with a greater punishment. Lopes I. 1999 UT 24, ^|15. It
stated, "When the legislature passed the gang enhancement provision, it acted just as it
did when it passed the firearm enhancement provision: it mandated imposition of an
enhancement only upon proof of elements over and above those required for the crime of
lesser consequence." Lopes I. 1999 UT 24, ^[15.
5

In comparing the gang enhancement provisions to the gun enhancement statute,
this Court construed Section 76-3-203.1 in a manner similar to other enhancements. For
example, in State v. Deli. 861 P.2d 431, 434 (Utah 1993), this Court reiterated that the
firearm enhancement statute did not create an offense or sentence separate from the
underlying crime. "[T]he legislature intended the penalty for using a firearm in the
commission of a felony to simply increase' or 'enhance' the original sentence imposed,
not to stand alone as a separate sentence." Id. Also, in Angus, this Court stated the
same: the firearm statute does not create a separate offense. Rather, the original offense
is enhanced. State v. Angus. 581 P.2d 992, 994, 995 (Utah 1978).
Thus, while Section 76-3-203.1 is not a "sentencing" consideration, see Lopes I.
1999 UT 24, it is similar to the firearm enhancement in that it enhances the underlying
offense. It transforms an underlying crime, in this case murder, into a greater offense that
requires proof of the murder elements and the in-concert elements. "Importantly for
present purposes, we concluded in Angus that while the State did not need to separately
charge the enhancement as a crime, it did need to prove each element, including the
defendant's use of a firearm, beyond a reasonable doubt because the crime was increased
as to degree by the presence of the firearm." Lopes I. 1999 UT 24, ^fl2 (citing Angus,
581P.2dat994).
Since the ruling in Lopes I is the law of the case, the trial court and parties were
bound by it in all proceedings in this matter. Corbett. 709 P.2d at 386; C & J Industries.
6

Inc.. 669 P.2d at 856 (ruling by appellate court is the "law of the case"; trial court is
bound to follow it). No further argument was necessary to bind the trial court to the
ruling, or to preserve the matter for appeal.
In addition, the trial court was fully apprised of the "law of the case" in this matter
during remand proceedings. The trial court had a copy of Lopes I before it in considering
remand issues (R. 212-228), and Lopes relied on Lopes I during argument in the matter.
(See R. 235, 273-78.) That was sufficient to preserve issues on remand. There is no
procedural bar to this Court's review of the matter on appeal.
2. The Remaining Provisions Set Forth in § 76-3-203.1 Support that the Statute
Does Not Serve to Create an Offense Separatefromthe Underlying Crime; Rather,
the Statute Enhances the Underlying Crime to Create a Greater Offense.
The remaining provisions contained in Section 76-3-203.1 (1995) further defy the
state's interpretation of Lopes L and its argument concerning the effect of Section 76-3203.1. In Lopes L this Court ruled that subsection (5)(c) of the gang enhancement statute
was unconstitutional. It severed that provisionfromthe statute. This Court left the
remaining portions of § 76-3-203.1 intact. Lopes L 1999 UT 24, ^{20. A surviving
provision states the following: "(5)(a) This section does not create any separate offense
but provides an enhanced penalty for the primary offense." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3203.1(5)(a) (1995) (emphasis added). That provision, in light of Lopes L supports that §
76-3-203.1 does not create a separate offense consisting only of the "in-concert"

7

elements. Rather, Section 76-3-203,1 must apply together with an underlying offense. In
the context of Lopes I, that means Section 76-3-203.1 serves to elevate an underlying
offense into a greater, enhanced offense. The enhanced offense in this case, in-concert
murder or Section 76-3-203.1 murder, stands in a greater-lesser relationship with murder.
See Angus, 581 P.2d at 995 (specifying that a crime without firearm enhancement stands
in a relationship of "lesser" offense to a crime with firearm enhancement).
The ruling in Lopes I concerning the effect of Section 76-3-203.1 supports Lopes's
arguments. It was binding on the trial court during remand proceedings. Lopes was not
required to present any additional argument to preserve the matter for appeal.
3. Lopes Argued in the Lower Court that the In-Concert Elements Together with
the Underlying Crime Constituted a Single Offense.
Contrary to the state's assertions concerning preservation (see S.B. at 8-10), Lopes
has argued throughout the proceedings in this case that the gang enhancement statute had
the effect of transforming an underlying offense into a greater, enhanced offense with a
higher punishment. That is, Lopes "preserved" the arguments for appeal.
Specifically, in the trial court Lopes argued that § 76-3-203.1 constituted an
offense - rather than a sentencing consideration - that included a mens rea and an actus
reus. The mens rea was "in concert" conduct, and the actus reus consisted of the underlying offense. Thus, to establish a § 76-3-203.1 offense, the state would be required to
prove the underlying offense plus in-concert conduct. (R. 41); Lopes I. 1999 UT 24, Tf5.
In addition, Judge Peuler recognized in the original trial court proceedings that
8

only one offense existed here: enhanced murder. (R. 363:10-11.) The judge stated that
Lopes was being charged with first-degree-felony murder that carried certain
enhancements, including the gang enhancement. (Id.)
Also, during trial court proceedings on remand, counsel for Lopes asked the court
"to proceed to trial on the homicide case which would include the gun enhancement and
any gang enhancement the state would choose to attempt to prove at a jury trial." (R.
364:3; see also 364:6.) These arguments contained in the record were sufficiently
preserved for appeal. This Court may proceed with review of the matter.2
B. THE STATE'S "NULLIFICATION" ARGUMENT IS IRRELEVANT. THE
CASE SHOULD HAVE PROCEEDED TO TRIAL.
The state seems to argue that if § 76-3-203.1 has the effect of elevating an underlying offense (i.e. murder in this case) to an enhanced offense (i.e. in-concert murder,
enhanced murder, or enhancement murder), such application will cause the offense of
murder to lose its "independent existence by virtue of the creation of the new offense."

2

The state claims that defendant "not only" failed to preserve the argument concerning
the effect of Section 76-3-203.1, but he "specifically recognized that the murder charge
and the enhancement charge were separate by requesting ' a jury trial on both the
homicide charge and the companion gang enhancement charge.'" (S.B. at 8 (citing R.
235).) While defense counsel's statements on the matter might be considered somewhat
clumsy, they cannot be construed as urged by the state. Rather, defense counsel's
statements reflect that Lopes was seeking a new trial on the entire greater offense of
enhanced murder, where the state would be required to establish the elements of
homicide and the in-concert elements to bring the offense within the higher penalty
prescribed by law: to wit, in-concert murder. (See R. 364:3 (defense counsel asked the
trial court on remand to proceed with the "homicide case," which included the gun
enhancement and the in-concert elements).)
9

(S.B. at 12; see also S.B. at 11-13 and n. 6.) That argument is nonsensical. Lopes does
not claim that the offense of murder is nullified by the gang enhancement statute. Indeed,
in the context of this case, murder still exists as a lesser offense.
The state apparently has made the "nullification" argument because it believes that
Lopes is asking this Court to enforce the remand order in Lopes I or to dismiss the
conviction for murder because that offense has somehow lost its independent status. (See
S.B. at 11-12.) Lopes is not asking for that kind of relief. He is requesting only that this
Court enforce the remand order in Lopes I.
Stated another way, if a prosecutor on remand determined to amend the information to dismiss the in-concert elements and to proceed only on a charge for murder, the
prosecutor may be allowed to do so. See Utah R. Crim. P. 4(d) (2001) (information may
be amended under certain circumstances); West Valley City v. McDonald, 948 P.2d 371,
373-74 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (prosecutor allowed to amend information charge for lesser
offense); Slatterv v. Covev & Co. Inc., 909 P.2d 925, 927-28 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (lawof-the-case doctrine allows court on remand to entertain certain issues). In that instance,
the offense of murder withfirearmenhancement would not be "nullified." Indeed, the
case would proceed to trial on the amended information for the lesser offense.
Consider the following scenario. Suppose a defendant has entered a conditional
guilty plea to a single, greater offense: aggravated murder. Suppose also that defendant
has preserved an issue for appeal challenging the constitutionality of the aggravating
10

circumstance charged in the case. Further suppose that this Court reviewed the matter on
appeal, clarified application of the aggravating circumstance, and remanded the case for a
new trial on the aggravated murder charge.
Once the case was remanded back to the trial court, if the prosecutor determined
he could not meet the burden of proof for application of the aggravating circumstance
under the standard articulated by this Court, he may be granted leave to amend the
information and to proceed with the matter for the lesser offense of murder. In that case,
the murder offense would not be nullified and the prosecutor would be able to proceed to
trial with primary responsibility for the prosecution of the case under the guidance of this
Court's ruling and the amended information. (See S.B. at 12, n.6.)
In this case, during remand proceedings, the prosecutor indicated he did not intend
to proceed with the in-concert murder offense as originally charged. In that instance, the
trial court should have allowed the prosecutor leave to modify or amend the information
and to proceed with the new trial on the amended charge for murder with firearm
enhancement. Instead, the trial court modified the conviction against Lopes and entered
judgment against him for murder without a jury trial on the matter. Slee Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-1-402(5) (1999) (a judgment of conviction may be entered by the trial court for a
lesser-included offense, without necessity of a new trial, only "if such relief is sought by
the defendant"). That was improper.
The trial court was not at liberty to disregard the remand order and to enter a
11

judgment of conviction for the lesser offense without a trial. The law is plain in that
regard. Utah R. App. P. 30(b) (2000) (l£ a judgment of conviction is reversed, a new trial
shall be held unless otherwise specified by the court); Utah R. Crim. P. 28(a) ("[if] a
judgment of conviction is reversed, a new trial shall be held unless otherwise specified by
the appellate court"); Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) (1999).3
The state claims Rules 28(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and 30(b) of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, are not applicable here notwithstanding the fact
that this was a criminal case, reversed on appeal, where this Court remanded for a new
trial. According to the state, "[n]o citation to authority is necessary" (S.B. at 13-14) to
recognize that the prosecutor may modify the charge after appeal in order that the lower
3

The state seems to argue that for purposes of Section 76-1-402(5), Lopes "sought1'
relief on the lesser-included offense of murder by entering into the conditional plea for
enhanced murder. (See S.B. at 15 (claiming defendant requested entry of a conviction on
the lesser murder charge when he entered the guilty plea for enhanced murder).) That is
incorrect. Lopes's plea was for the greater offense. He did not "seek" relief on the
included, lesser offense simply by pleading to elements common to both the enhanced
offense and the lesser-included offense.
If Lopes had gone to trial and specifically requested an instruction on a lesser
offense, there may be sufficient basis to claim that he sought relief under the lesser
offense for application of Section 76-1-402(5). See State v. Johnson. 821 P.2d 1150,
1159-60 (Utah 1991) (although defendant technically did not seek a reduced sentence "on
appeal," Section 76-1-402(5) requirements are satisfied where defendant requested a
lesser-included offense instruction at trial in lower court); State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,
1209 (Utah 1993) (recognizing that Court forced application of § 76-1-402(5) in cases
where defendant requested lesser-included offense instruction at trial).
Lopes did not go to trial and he did not seek a conviction on a lesser offense.
Rather, he entered a conditional plea on the enhanced offense with the possibility of a
trial if he prevailed on appeal. Lopes prevailed on appeal. Section 76-1-402(5) does not
apply in this case.
12

court may avoid the new trial. Indeed, the state is unable to cite to any authority for such
a proposition. But see Utah R. App. P. 30(b); Utah R. Crim. P. 28(a).
In Litman v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 825 F.2d 1506 (11th Cir. 1987),
cert, denied, 484 U.S. 1006 (1988), an en banc court of appeals considered whether a trial
court may disregard a "remand" order for a "new trial" when a party in the trial court has
made a unilateral motion to modify the judgment after appeal.
In that case, the plaintiff sued defendant for breach of contract and two counts of
slander. After a jury trial, which resulted in compensatory and punitive damages against
defendant, the defendant appealed on several grounds. IdL at 1512-13. In the original
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment with one
exception. It ruled that plaintiff failed as a matter of law to establish slander in
connection with one count. Id. The court reversed the award in damages relating to the
slander claim, "which necessarily resulted in a reversal of the entire punitive damage
award." Id. Thereafter, the case was "remand[ed]" to the district court for a "new trial"
on the issue of punitive damages. Id. at 1507, 1513.
On remand in the district court, the defendant made a motion to waive tlie new
trial. Id at 1513. The defendant filed papers consenting to the original district court
verdict on the punitive damage issue (which included punitive damages for the slander
count that was successfully dismissed on appeal) in the interest of terminating the lawsuit.
IdL at 1513. Plaintiff objected to the motion and sought enforcement of the "new trial"
13

order. The trial court granted defendant's motion and determined that a new trial would
be inappropriate. M, Thereafter, the district court entered judgment in the matter and
plaintiff appealed. Id
In the second appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit examined the
relationship between trial courts and appellate courts in the federal system, and discussed
the law of the case doctrine. The court recognized that "[t]he law of the case doctrine
was created to ensure that authority and responsibility remain properly allocated among
the courts." Id. at 1510. "A district court when acting under an appellate court's
mandate, 'cannot vary it, or examine it for any other purpose than execution; or give any
other or further relief; or review it, even for apparent error, upon a matter decided on
appeal; or intermeddle with it, further than to settle so much as has been remanded.'" Id.
at 1511 (cites omitted).
When an appellate court issues a specific mandate it is not subject to interpretation; the district court has an obligation to carry out the order. A different result
would encourage and invite district courts to engage in ad hoc analysis of the
propriety of appellate court rulings. Post mandate maneuvering in the district
courts would undermine the authority of appellate courts and create a great deal of
uncertainty in the judicial process. It would also eliminate any hope of finality.
Id at 1511-12.
The court reiterated that its opinion in the first case governed "the rights and
obligations of both parties." It also specified that "[ojnce the appellate ruling became
final, the right to a new trial belonged to neither party individually but rather to both. The
law of the case proscribed the outcome and could not be altered" unilaterally by one
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party. Id at 1514, 1515. Specifically, after the first appeal, one party may not take
unilateral action in the trial court to avoid the new trial, and the trial court may not
disregard the remand order for a new trial under those circumstances. Id. at 1515-16.
The doctrines articulated in Litman may be applied in this jurisdiction. See jLe., C
& J Industries, Inc., 669 P.2d at 856 (recognizing law-of-the-case doctrine). The plain
language of Rule 30(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Rule 28(a), Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure, does not entitle only one party to a new trial if a judgment of
conviction is reversed. Rather, those rules specify that if a judgment is reversed, a "new
trial shall be held unless otherwise specified by the appellate court." That is, the new trial
right after an appeal belongs to neither party individually but rather to both.
Also, pursuant to Rule 24(d), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, "if a new trial is
granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no trial had been held and the
former verdict shall not be used or mentioned either in evidence or in argument" Utah
R. Crim. P. 24(d) (2001) (emphasis added); see also Wheeler v. John Deere Co. 935 F.2d
1090,1096 (10th Cir. 1991) (reversal of judgment and remand for new trial places parties
in a pre-trial posture).
In the context of this case, upon reversal of the judgment on appeal and remand for
a new trial, Lopes was returned to a pre-trial posture with regard to the enhanced murder
charge. Thus, unless the parties agreed to a new resolution in the matter, Lopes was
entitled to enforcement of the remand order for a new trial. See also Utah Const, art. I, §§
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7, 12; U.S. Const, amend. XIV (recognizing a criminal defendant's constitutional rights to
a jury trial). While the prosecutor may be granted leave to amend the charge during
remand proceedings for the lesser offense (see supra pages 10-11, herein), he may not
take other unilateral action in the trial court to avoid the new trial, and the trial court may
not disregard the remand order.4
"[The] lower court must implement both the letter and the spirit of the mandate,
taking into account the appellate court's opinion and the circumstances it embraces."
Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1038 (Utah 1995). "The mandate must be
followed even though the lower court subsequently addressing the issue may believe that
the issue could have been better decided in another fashion." Id Lopes respectfully
requests enforcement of the remand order.
C. THE PLEA COLLOQUY IS VOID OF ANY DISCUSSION CONCERNING
EITHER AN UNCONDITIONAL PLEA OR A BIFURCATED PLEA.
The state claims that prior to the first appeal Lopes entered either a bifurcated plea
4

On remand, the trial court ruled that Lopes was "entitled to a trial on the § 76-3-203.1
(gang enhancement) charge, not on the criminal homicide charge with firearm
enhancement." (S.B. at 15 (citing R. 343-44).) Thereafter, the trial court determined that
because the state was willing to dismiss the in-concert elements, a new trial would be
inappropriate. (See R. 344 ("Order").)
The trial court misconstrued this Court's ruling and remand order in Lopes I. As
set forth above, this Court remanded the case for a new trial on the enhancement charge
of murder. See supra, subpoint A, herein; Brief of Appellant at subpoint B. At the point
when the state determined to dismiss the in-concert elements, the trial court was not at
liberty to reject the "new trial" order on remand. See Utah R. App. P. 30(b); Utah R.
Crim. P. 28(a). Indeed, the trial court should have proceeded with the new trial on the
amended charge.
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or an unconditional plea as it related to the elements for murder and the firearm
enhancement. Thus, he was not entitled to a "new trial" on the enhancement offense as
ordered by this Court. (See S.B. at 15-23.) The state's argument is incorrect under the
law-of-the-case doctrine (see opening Brief of Appellant at subpoints C.3. & 4.) and it is
not supported by the record.
Nevertheless, the state cites to portions of the record in connection with its
argument. Specifically, the state relies on the following.
During the plea colloquy, the original trial judge, Judge Peuler, informed Lopes
that if he prevailed on appeal with respect to the issues concerning the constitutionality of
Section 76-3-203.1, he may be entitled to withdraw his guilty plea on the enhanced
offense. (S.B. at 16-18 (citing R. 363:14-16).) The prosecutor disagreed with Judge
Peuler's characterization of the matter, and thereafter, Judge Peuler informed Lopes of
the possibilities if he were to prevail on appeal. (Id.)
. . . I believe that it's possible under a reading of the case [law,] Mr. Lope[s,] that if
the appellate court says that I was wrong on the gang enhancement statute that you
may not be able to withdraw your guilty [plea], you may simply have your
sentence adjusted. Now, I understand that there may also be a possibility that you
could withdraw your guilty plea at that time but I'm not certain about that and I
don't know if anybody is at this point.
(R. 363:15-16.) The state claims that portion of the colloquy supports a bifurcated plea.
That is incorrect. It reflects simply that the trial judge had no confidence in how
the matter would proceed if Lopes prevailed on appeal. The parties and the trial court
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anticipated that this Court would fashion a remedy if Lopes prevailed. This Court did
fashion a remedy. It reversed and remanded the matter for a new trial. Lopes L 1999 UT
24, fflfl, 21-22. Lopes seeks enforcement of that remedy.
Next, the state relies on the plea affidavit. It claims that because the affidavit
reflects that Lopes pled guilty to the murder elements, the plea was unconditional. (S.B.
at 20.) That is incorrect. The plea affidavit fails to disclose the nature of the plea one
way or the other. (See R. 103-09.) Rather, according to Rule 11(e)(6), if a plea is
tendered as a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, as in this case, the court
may not accept the plea until it has determined the nature of the agreement. Utah R.
Crim. P. 11(e)(6) (2001). In this case, the trial judge specified that she understood the
nature of the plea to be pursuant to State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).5 "I
understand that this plea today is in the nature of what we call a [Sery] plea." (R.
363:14.) Counsel for the defense answered, "That's true, Judge." (Id.) The state did not
correct that representation. Thus, the only reference to the nature of the plea reflects a
conditional plea. Compare Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(6), with R. 363:14. That was what the
trial court accepted. See Lopes L 1999 UT 24, ^[3 n.2.
Finally, the state seems to claim that defendant's references to Sery during the plea
colloquy support the bifurcated nature of the plea. (See S.B. at 18-20 (citing R. 363:18-

5

Sery allows a party to plead guilty to an offense and to preserve an issue for purposes
of appeal in connection with the plea. Sery, 758 P.2d at 940.
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19).) Lopes's responses to that argument arefollyset forth in the opening Brief of
Appellant. See Brief of Appellant at subpoint C.l(b).
In sum, that portion of the colloquy did not serve to transform the conditional
nature of the plea into a bifurcated plea without more. Indeed, defense counsel's
references to Sery simply served to expressly define the issues preserved for appeal "as
part of the plea agreement,11 Sery, 758 P.2d at 940. It was perfectly appropriate for Lopes
to enter a conditional plea with respect to the entire offense of in-concert murder, and to
preserve for appeal only one aspect of the enhanced offense. See State v. Montoya, 887
P.2d 857, 859-60 (Utah 1994); State v. Rivera. 943 P.2d 1344, 1345 (Utah 1997) (issue
preserved for appeal does not have to be dispositive of entire matter).
In that regard, Lopes anticipated that if he prevailed on appeal, he may be entitled
to withdraw the guilty plea on the enhanced charge and proceed to trial, where he would
be allowed to defend himself and to present his evidence to the jury on the matter. (See
R. 363:16 (trial court identifies possible remedies if Lopes prevailed on appeal)); Rivera,
943 P.2d at 1345-46 (defendant may enter conditional plea as to entire matter, preserving
non-dispositive issue for appeal; if defendant prevails on appeal, he may be able to
proceed to trial to defend himself against the charges).
Since Lopes was not informed at any time that the plea was in any way
unconditional, it would be inappropriate to interpret portions of the plea as such at this
juncture. See Brief of Appellant at subpoint C.l.(a).
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Lopes incorporates herein by reference the additional arguments made in the
opening Brief of Appellant, and respectfully asks this Court to enter an order enforcing
the ruling in Lopes I for a new trial.
CONCLUSION
Lopes respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's order modifying
the judgment, and remand the case for a new trial as ordered in Lopes I.
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